It seems that the focus of the parties' arguments in Rasouli is on whether stopping life support constitutes treatment. (I posted the appellate briefs here) The Ontario HCCA seems to clearly require consent for all treatment. But is stopping treatment = treatment?
The physician appellants argue that it is. The family respondents (and intervenor EPC) argue that it is not. But it seems that plaintiff and intervenor have the better argument. After all, the physicians are surely not proposing to wholly abandon the patient. They are not terminating their treatment relationship. Instead, they are just changing the nature of the treatment provided. They want to move from curative/aggressive measures to palliative/comfort measures. It is a switch from treatment A to treatment B. In short, what the physicians propose is still treatment. See, e.g. Hartsell v. Fort Sanders Reg. Med. (Tenn. 1995).
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